“Clause and Effect”
By ADAM FREEDMAN
Published in The New York Times on December 16, 2007.
LAST month, the Supreme Court agreed
to consider District of Columbia v. Heller, which struck down Washington’s
strict gun ordinance as a violation of the Second Amendment’s “right to keep
and bear arms.”
This will be the first time in
nearly 70 years that the court has considered the Second Amendment. The outcome
of the case is difficult to handicap, mainly because so little is known about
the justices’ views on the lethal device at the center of the controversy: the
comma. That’s right, the “small crooked point,” as Richard Mulcaster described
this punctuation upstart in 1582. The official version of the Second Amendment
has three of the little blighters:
A well regulated
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
The decision invalidating the
district’s gun ban, written by Judge Laurence H. Silberman of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, cites the second comma
(the one after “state”) as proof that the Second Amendment does not merely
protect the “collective” right of states to maintain their militias, but endows
each citizen with an “individual” right to carry a gun, regardless of
membership in the local militia.
How does a mere comma do that?
According to the court, the second comma divides the amendment into two
clauses: one “prefatory” and the other “operative.” On this reading, the bit
about a well-regulated militia is just preliminary throat clearing; the framers
don’t really get down to business until they start talking about “the right of
the people ... shall not be infringed.”
The circuit court’s opinion is only
the latest volley in a long-simmering comma war. In a 2001 Fifth Circuit case,
a group of anti-gun academics submitted an amicus curiae (friend of the court)
brief arguing that the “unusual” commas of the Second Amendment support the
collective rights interpretation. According to these amici, the founders’ use
of commas reveals that what they really meant to say was “a well-regulated
militia ... shall not be infringed.”
Now that the issue is heading to the
Supreme Court, the pro-gun American Civil Rights Union is firing back with its
own punctuation-packing brief. Nelson Lund, a professor of law at George Mason
University, argues that everything before the second comma is an “absolute
phrase” and, therefore, does not modify anything in the main clause. Professor
Lund states that the Second Amendment “has exactly the same meaning that it
would have if the preamble had been omitted.”
Refreshing though it is to see
punctuation at the center of a national debate, there could scarcely be a worse
place to search for the framers’ original intent than their use of commas. In
the 18th century, punctuation marks were as common as medicinal leeches and
just about as scientific. Commas and other marks evolved from a variety of
symbols meant to denote pauses in speaking. For centuries, punctuation was as
chaotic as individual speech patterns.
The situation was even worse in the
law, where a long English tradition held that punctuation marks were not
actually part of statutes (and, therefore, courts could not consider
punctuation when interpreting them). Not surprisingly, lawmakers took a
devil-may-care approach to punctuation. Often, the whole business of
punctuation was left to the discretion of scriveners, who liked to show their
chops by inserting as many varied marks as possible.
Another problem with trying to find
meaning in the Second Amendment’s commas is that nobody is certain how many
commas it is supposed to have. The version that ended up in the National
Archives has three, but that may be a fluke. Legal historians note that some
states ratified a two-comma version. At least one recent law journal article
refers to a four-comma version.
The best way to make sense of the
Second Amendment is to take away all the commas (which, I know, means that only
outlaws will have commas). Without the distracting commas, one can focus on the
grammar of the sentence. Professor Lund is correct that the clause about a
well-regulated militia is “absolute,” but only in the sense that it is
grammatically independent of the main clause, not that it is logically
unrelated. To the contrary, absolute clauses typically provide a causal or
temporal context for the main clause.
The founders — most of whom were
classically educated — would have recognized this rhetorical device as the
“ablative absolute” of Latin prose. To take an example from Horace likely to
have been familiar to them: “Caesar, being in command of the earth, I fear
neither civil war nor death by violence” (ego nec tumultum nec mori per vim
metuam, tenente Caesare terras). The main clause flows logically from the
absolute clause: “Because Caesar commands the earth, I fear neither civil war
nor death by violence.”
Likewise, when the justices finish
diagramming the Second Amendment, they should end up with something that
expresses a causal link, like: “Because a well regulated militia is necessary
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms
shall not be infringed.” In other words, the amendment is really about
protecting militias, notwithstanding the originalist arguments to the contrary.
Advocates of both gun rights and gun
control are making a tactical mistake by focusing on the commas of the Second
Amendment. After all, couldn’t one just as easily obsess about the founders’
odd use of capitalization? Perhaps the next amicus brief will find the true
intent of the amendment by pointing out that “militia” and “state” are
capitalized in the original, whereas “people” is not.
Adam Freedman, the author of “The
Party of the First Part: The Curious World of Legalese,” writes the Legal Lingo
column for New York Law Journal Magazine.